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1. INTRODUCTION Lifecycle SMEs
1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that small firms behave differently to large enterprises regard-
ing external financing (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Their capital structures are often much
more weighted towards owners-equity and internal financing due to difficulties access-
ing external debt and equity (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006, Beck et al., 2008). Such
difficulties often arise due to information asymmetries, collateral constraints and other
financial market imperfections that drive a wedge between the internal and external cost
of capital. These concerns have increased in prevalence for European SMEs given the
severe financial crisis in the late 2000s, which had an adverse effect on credit availabil-
ity and bank lending, in particular for small firms (Wehinger, 2014, Holton et al., 2013,
2014). In this regard, understanding the financial management and capital structure deci-
sions of SMEs is critical to understanding the financial impact on their growth prospects
(Vanacker & Manigart, 2010).
It has also been documented that SMEs finance their activities differently across
their lifecycle (Berger & Udell, 1998, 2006) with different levels of debt and equity
being more prevalent at different points across the age distribution. A number of studies
have explored whether differences in capital structure can be explained by variation in
firm-level factors (Hall et al., 2004, Mateev et al., 2013) or by structural differences be-
tween countries (Daskalakis & Psillaki, 2008, Psillaki & Daskalakis, 2009). Despite this,
few studies have considered the differences in the age-debt relationship across firms and
counties. Notable exceptions include Michaelas et al. (1999), Chittenden et al. (1996)
and La Rocca et al. (2011) who showed that financing is related to the lifecycle of the
firm in their analyses of SMEs in several European countries. However, to date, no study
has combined a cross-country estimation setting with an exploration of the firm-level and
country-level determinants of the link between firm age and capital structure. This paper
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aims to address this gap in the literature.
Using firm-level panel data for 15 countries over the period 2005-2012, we explore
the determinants of SMEs capital structure across the age distribution of firms allowing
the age-capital structure relationship to be non-linear in nature (as in La Rocca et al.
(2011)). We then assess whether the patterns in the pooled cross-country sample are
common across each country or whether country heterogeneity can be identified. Finally,
we assess how the age-capital structure relationship is affected by firm and country level
heterogeneity. Collateral availability and liquidity are the chosen indicators of firm level
heterogeneity, while country level heterogeneity is proxied using a selection of financial
system structure characteristics. Our contribution is therefore fourfold. First, we use a
broader sample than existing studies (Giannetti, 2003, Hall et al., 2004) exploring cross
country differences in the age-capital structure relationship. Second, we control for the
sample selection bias inherent in studies that focus solely on the extensive margin of the
debt-equity ratio by following a Heckman approach on our panel of firms. Third, we
explore whether collateral availability and liquidity impact the non-linear relationship
between age and capital structure. And fourth, we explore the link between age, capital
structure and financial system development.
Our key findings show the existence of a negative but non-linear relationship between
age and debt when all countries are pooled. However estimating country-specific regres-
sions, we find substantial variation and indeed, a positive relationship in some instances.
We delve further into the drivers of these heterogeneous results by examining the links
between firm age and other firm level and country specific characteristics. The estimates
suggest that the negative relationship between age and debt can be significantly linked to
a lack of internal resources of younger firms and also to a heavier reliance on collateral
to access bank debt. At the country level, we find that younger firms are more affected
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by the quality of the banking sector as they have less access to alternative sources of
capital. This suggests that cross country differences in firm capital structure are partially
explained by heterogeneity of firm-level collateral and liquidity constraints as well as
differences in banking market structure.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the main theories behind financ-
ing behaviour of SMEs, and several hypotheses to be tested are described. Section 3
describes the empirical models estimated and the data and variables used. Results are
presented in Section 4, and Section 5 provides some final concluding comments.
2 Financing behaviour of SMEs
It is a general finding in the empirical corporate finance literature that external fund-
ing sources available to SMEs are different from those generally used by larger firms
or corporations. While the latter have the possibility of issuing corporate debt or equity
onto capital markets (Lo´pez-Gracia & Sogorb-Mira, 2008), external financing sources
for small firms are almost exclusively reduced to acquiring debt from lending institu-
tions. An alternative option is to fund investment though the use of internal resources
(La Rocca et al., 2011). Moreover, large firms are usually listed and their financial in-
formation is publicly available. However, information on small firms’ economic data is
scarce, not detailed or directly unavailable, leading to information asymmetries between
firm managers/owners and debt issuing institutions. This generates difficulties accessing
external credit, which is almost entirely reliant on the availability of collateral (Chitten-
den et al., 1996).
Several theoretical frameworks that accommodate financing behaviour of small firms
have been proposed. The pecking order theory is considered to be the most widely ap-
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plicable framework to small firm financing (Myers, 1984, Myers & Majluf, 1984). This
theory builds on the premise that information asymmetries drive a wedge between the
internal and external costs of capital. The theory suggests that small firms make fi-
nancing choices in a hierarchical fashion, first using internal finance sources (when/until
available) as opposed to external sources due to the relative cost differences (Berger &
Udell, 1998, Lo´pez-Gracia & Sogorb-Mira, 2008, La Rocca et al., 2011, European Cen-
tral Bank, 2013). Other theories also found in the literature are the trade-off theory or
the agent theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The trade-off theory proposes that, when
seeking their optimal capital structure, firms consider the advantages and disadvantages
of additional debt, which leads to debt reaching an optimal point for each firm (Lo´pez-
Gracia & Sogorb-Mira, 2008). According to this theory firms make decisions in an incre-
mental rather than a hierarchical way (Vanacker & Manigart, 2010). Finally, the agency
theory proposes that the fixed cost of firms’ debt acquisition transactions causes addi-
tional difficulties for small firms, which face higher monitoring and management costs
of debt (Chittenden et al., 1996), resulting in a preference for internal funding resources.
2.1 Size vs. age
The relation between firm size and financing has been widely analysed in the literature
(Beck et al., 2008). However, the relative importance of different financing sources used
by firms across their lifecycle has received less attention. The literature on age and fi-
nancing structure posits that younger firms face additional difficulties when accessing
external financing which ease as the firm ages (Berger & Udell, 1998, 2006). These chal-
lenges come about due to a number of factors including collateral availability, liquidity, a
track record and opaque survival prospects. The age of the firm can therefore determine
the lenders cost and the availability of funds (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). Moreover, age
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can be considered a proxy for increased reputation or reduced information asymmetry at
different stages of a firm’s lifecycle (Berger & Udell, 1998, La Rocca et al., 2011). In
practice however, there usually is an overlap between age and size (i.e. young firms tend
to also be micro/small while older firms are more evenly distributed across the size spec-
trum), therefore it is possible that previous less comprehensive analyses have wrongly
attributed to size some of the effect of firm age on capital structure as noted in Lawless
(2014).
In general, the literature focuses around two contrasting theories (Lo´pez-Gracia &
Sogorb-Mira, 2008): a) a negative relationship between age and debt (pecking-order
theory) and b) a positive relationship between age and debt (trade-off theory). Some
authors propose that younger firms are likely to be less leveraged than older firms, since
they are thought to rely more heavily on internal sources of financing (La Rocca et al.,
2011) or on loans from the owner or family members (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). They
suggest that as firms become older, problems of information asymmetry abate due to
increased reputation, credibility and tangible assets, which may grant easier access to
long-term debt (Berger & Udell, 1998, La Rocca et al., 2011). Accordingly, age can
be expected to have a positive effect on leverage, due to older enterprises facing lower
borrowing costs leading to higher levels of debt for older firms (Lo´pez-Gracia & Sogorb-
Mira, 2008). Alternatively, a negative relation between firm age and debt could also
be hypothesised, since older firms are able to retain profits or access external market
equity financing easier than younger firms, avoiding using debt (Hall et al., 2004, Lo´pez-
Gracia & Sogorb-Mira, 2008, La Rocca et al., 2011). For all these reasons, we do not
hypothesise any a priori effects of age on firm debt (H1a,b; Table 1).
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Table 1: Hypotheses tested
Hypothesis Description
H1a Age is positively related to debt The access to external bank financing is
easier for more mature firms (trade-off the-
ory)
H1b Age is negatively related to debt Younger firms have a higher reliance on
debt, as they are not able to retain internal
resources (pecking order theory)
H2 The effect of age on debt displays country
specific differences
H3a The effect of age on debt is likely to vary
depending on firms’ collateral availability
Younger firms are likely to have higher re-
liance on collateral
H3b The effect of age on debt may be different
depending on firms’ liquidity levels
With higher liquidity levels, there might be
less need of external finance, but only for
mature firms
H4a The effect of age on debt is affected by
stock market capitalisation
Mature firms might get less indebted when
stock markets are well developed in a
country
H4b The effect of age on debt is affected by
bank concentration
More competitive banking sectors result in
higher debt availability for younger firms
H4c The effect of age on debt is affected by the
presence of foreign banks
Younger firms have more debt when for-
eign banks are lending money in a country
It is clear from the discussion above that the relation between debt and firm age
needs to be tested empirically. Previous empirical analyses on this subject found mixed
results in several European countries. Chittenden et al. (1996) and Michaelas et al. (1999)
estimated a negative relationship between age and debt ratios for SMEs in the UK, while
in their analysis of Spanish SMEs, Lo´pez-Gracia & Sogorb-Mira (2008) also found age
to be negatively related to debt. In a more recent paper, La Rocca et al. (2011) evaluated
whether the lifecycle is a relevant factor in small firm financing, and found that the effect
of age was positive for Italian SMEs. Finally, Serrasqueiro & Nunes (2012), Serrasqueiro
& Caetano (2015), Matias & Serrasqueiro (2017) uncovered a negative effect of age on
debt for Portuguese firms.
7
2. FINANCING BEHAVIOUR OF SMES Lifecycle SMEs
2.2 Lifecycle and capital structure in an international context
One potential explanation for variation in observed capital structures and its determi-
nants across countries is the degree of financial development and the relative availabil-
ity of bank and non-bank financing (Gonza´lez & Gonza´lez, 2008). Previous literature
concluded that assuming a homogeneous effect of firm level characteristics on leverage
across countries is unrealistic (De Jong et al., 2008). Therefore, we perform our anal-
ysis in a cross-country setting in order to explicitly explore potential differences of the
effect of age (and other firm level and macroeconomic characteristics) on capital struc-
ture (H2, Table 1). Noticeable cross-country differences in debt structure of firms exist,
and important determinants of firm financing decisions (such as institutional factors and
taxation systems, growth opportunities or different macroeconomic conditions) are very
likely to also present country-specific variation, leading to differences in SMEs financing
decisions across countries.
The majority of previous empirical analyses explored the relationship between age
and debt using data for a single country. Consequently, important differences in the data
and methodologies they used preclude making direct cross country comparisons of the
effect of age on capital structure. Only Giannetti (2003) and Hall et al. (2004) performed
comparative analyses while also exploring the effects of age. Giannetti (2003) used a
sample of eight European countries for the period 1993-1997 and found mixed results
of age (and age squared) across countries. A linear negative effect was uncovered for
France, the Netherlands and the UK; while in Portugal the effect was found to be posi-
tive although at a decreasing rate. Hall et al. (2004), using a sample of eight European
countries in 1995, also found differing effects depending on the country considred (the
effect of age on short term debt was negative in Italy, Spain and the UK, while the effect
on long term debt was negative/positive in the UK/Spain respectively). Finally, European
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Central Bank (2013) explored the determinants of capital structure using data for several
European countries using more recent data for the years 2000 and 2010. They found that
age had a positive effect on debt using the pooled dataset, however they did not estimate
country specific regressions. Therefore, our analysis complements previous literature by
estimating uniform models using homogeneous and updated data for selected European
countries, which allows to establish reliable comparisons of the age-capital structure re-
lation across countries.
2.3 Firm and cross-country heterogeneity
Given the expected cross-country differences of the determinants of capital structure, we
focus on exploring whether the differing effects of firm age in particular can be explained
by firm level or by cross-country heterogeneity.
2.3.1 Firm-level factors
In terms of firm level heterogeneity, there is a lack of empirical evidence on whether the
effect of age on capital structure varies depending on certain firm characteristics. We
chose to focus on these two characteristics because of the well established liquidity and
collateral constraints that SMEs often face in accessing bank financing. We hypothesise
that the effect of firm age on debt will change depending on firm liquidity and the avail-
ability of collateral. First, given the extent that younger firms are more informationally
opaque, we expect them to have higher dependence on collateral in order to obtain higher
levels of debt (H3a; Table 1). Second, given the additional difficulties younger firms face
when accessing external finance, we hypothesise that if higher liquidity is available to
them, they would resort less to external sources of financing (H3b; Table 1). In other
words, the extent to which liquidity affects decisions regarding debt is likely to be more
9
2. FINANCING BEHAVIOUR OF SMES Lifecycle SMEs
important for younger firms, since financing investment though external funds is riskier
than using internal resources.
2.3.2 Country-specific factors
Relatively few studies have explored the relation between country specific heterogeneity
and firms’ capital structure across their lifecycle. There is some evidence of institu-
tional factors (Giannetti, 2003) and banking system characteristics (Beck et al., 2004,
Ryan et al., 2014) affecting firm financing differently depending on their size. However,
little evidence exists regarding different effects across the age distribution. Gonza´lez
& Gonza´lez (2008) argued that the information asymmetries and agency costs that are
understood to determine the financing choices of SMEs across their lifecycle present dif-
ferences depending on countries’ financial development and the characteristics of their
banking systems. In order to provide some new empirical evidence, we test the relation-
ship between bank concentration, share of foreign bank assets and stock market capitali-
sation and firm level debt decisions at different stages of the firm lifecycle.
The relationship between the development of stock markets and the capital struc-
ture of SMEs is unclear a priori. Equity markets have a significant informational role,
therefore in countries where such markets are well developed, information asymmetries
between investors and firms may be reduced to a certain extent (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Mak-
simovic, 1996). Although the information aggregation role of the market is likely to be
more significant for large firms, smaller firms might still benefit from spill-over effects
(Beck et al., 2009). In addition, in the absence of developed stock markets SMEs might
miss on financing opportunities appropriate for large scale growth projects unlikely to
get the required financing through the banking sector (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Maksimovic,
1996). Therefore, we expect that in countries with developed stock markets, funding di-
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versification options would imply that firms will need to rely less on bank financing as
they mature (H4a; Table 1).
We explore the effects of the banking system on capital structure using two indica-
tors, bank concentration and the presence of foreign banks. Two competing theories are
typically proposed in the literature when considering the relationship between bank com-
petition and credit access, the market power theory and the information theory. Accord-
ing to the first, increased market power resulting from higher bank concentration, leads
to lower loan supply at higher interest rates (Beck et al., 2004). According to the second,
higher bank concentration may incentivise banks to invest in gathering information by
establishing close relationships with borrowers over time, facilitating the availability of
credit (Petersen & Rajan, 1995, Gonza´lez & Gonza´lez, 2008). The information theory
might be suitable to explain the relation between bank concentration and firm age and
financing choices. Lenders in less competitive banking systems might choose to estab-
lish long-term relationships with young borrowers, since they can benefit form firms’
expected surpluses as they get older (Petersen & Rajan, 1995). Therefore we expect that
less competition in the banking sector would benefit the credit applications of younger
firms (H4b; Table 1). The presence of foreign banks is understood to benefit SMEs both
directly and indirectly (Beck et al., 2009). First, foreign banks might have greater ex-
pertise and technical capabilities and are therefore able to finance large and small firms
equally (de la Torre et al., 2010, Beck et al., 2011). Second, more foreign banks can
increase competition in the banking sector, therefore even if they focus on lending to
larger firms, local banks might choose to focus on the neglected SMEs sector to improve
their market share (Beck et al., 2009). We would expect a similar relationship with firm
age, and therefore hypothesise that a larger presence of foreign banks eases the access of
younger firms to debt (H4c; Table 1).
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3 Models estimated and data
3.1 Data and variables
In this analysis, we use the Amadeus dataset1 spanning 8 years of data (2005-2012)
across fifteen European countries2. Several data cleaning criteria in line with standard
good practice were followed prior to estimation. Firms which had less than 3 consecutive
observations were dropped, resulting in an average number of consecutive observations
per firm of 5.3 years. This makes the panel strongly unbalanced. Outliers, defined as
observations which were located above/below the 99%/1% percentiles of each variable,
were also removed from the sample. In compliance with the definition of SME by the Eu-
ropean Commission, firms with more than 250 employees or a turnover superior to e 50
million were dropped. We also excluded firms belonging to the financial and insurance
sectors (according to the NACE Rev. 2 classification).
Our assessment of the determinants of firm capital structure across their lifecycle
takes into account two different aspects of firm debt. First, some firms have no debt,
which leads to a left-truncation of the debt-to-total funds distribution. Hence standard
estimation procedures on this distribution would not be suitable. Second, once firms take
some debt, they then face the choice of what level of indebtedness is appropriate. This
two stage decision making must be measured in our data and accounted for in the esti-
mation approach. Therefore, two different dependent variables are defined. For the case
of the debt uptake decisions, a binary variable that equals 1 for firms that have debt and
1Bureau Van Dijk compiles this harmonized firm level data that includes accounting infor-
mation from several countries. The data is based on balance sheets and income statements.
2Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Estonia (EE), Greece
(EL), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Croatia (HR), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT),
Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK). The observations are not evenly distributed across
countries or years, see Appendix A. The choice was made based on the data availability (i.e. a
reasonable number of observations to estimate the country-specific regressions).
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0 for firms without debt is constructed. In order to model debt decisions, we use the ratio
of total debt to total capital (total debt plus shareholders funds) as dependent variable,
similar to Jo˜eveer (2013b)3. Table 2 shows the average debt dummy and debt ratios for
each country. Clear differences in debt ratios can be appreciated across countries.
3.1.1 Firm-specific variables
Several firm specific and industry specific factors affecting debt structure have been typ-
ically identified in the literature. Age is the main variable of interest in this analysis. It
describes the financial cycle with respect to the age of a firm. Both age and age squared
are included, in order to account for possible non-linearities in the relationship between
the firm lifecycle and debt. The possibility of a non-linear relation has only been explored
in Giannetti (2003) and La Rocca et al. (2011) so far.
Another important determinant of firm leverage is firm size. Larger firms usually
have more assets and stable clash flows, which eases their access to external funds from
banks, as they are likely to be considered less risky borrowers (Rajan & Zingales, 1995,
Lo´pez-Gracia & Sogorb-Mira, 2008, La Rocca et al., 2011). Firm liquidity is included
in the regression in order to capture the role of internal resources as substitutes for exter-
nal financing (Hall et al., 2004). A variable controlling for profitability is also included,
which intends to control for the strategic behaviour where firm managers prefer to keep
retained profits and instead use debt to finance investment because debt interest may
shield firms from taxation (Michaelas et al., 1999, Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Tangibility is
also controlled for in the estimations. Tangible assets are susceptible to be used as col-
lateral and therefore reduce the costs of acquiring external debt (Chittenden et al., 1996).
3Rajan & Zingales (1995) offers an extensive discussion of the different possible specifi-
cations for leverage ratios. They considered the debt to capital ratio to have the advantage of
providing a better representation of past financing decisions, as opposed to other commonly used
specifications such as debt over total or net assets.
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Another regressor included is firm growth, defined as firm specific output differential,
which can be interpreted as the effect of future business prospects on firm debt (Hall
et al., 2004, European Central Bank, 2013, Ku¨hnhausen & Stieber, 2014). To account
for industry specific differences affecting firm leverage, both industry dummies and the
intra-sector growth opportunities are included in the regressions. Finally, year and coun-
try fixed effects are included in order to control for differences in institutional factors and
macroeconomic conditions4. Average values for these variables in each country are pro-
vided in Table 2. In general, important heterogeneity can be observed across countries
for all firm characteristics.
Table 2: 2005-2012 averages
Debt dummy Debt ratio Profitability Liquidity Collateral Growth opp. Age Output diff. Micro Small
BE 0.667 0.608 0.027 0.091 0.291 0.078 24.247 0.007 0.109 0.547
BG 0.571 0.808 0.051 0.117 0.377 -0.643 10.995 -0.038 0.694 0.249
CZ 0.535 0.667 0.024 0.162 0.334 0.149 10.741 -0.026 0.125 0.417
DE 0.885 0.735 0.042 0.088 0.353 -0.089 21.335 0.029 0.311 0.358
EE 0.89 0.773 0.035 0.119 0.519 -0.332 9.711 -0.014 0.354 0.415
EL 0.79 0.524 0.011 0.089 0.316 0.02 19.232 -0.017 0.481 0.42
ES 0.655 0.685 0.006 0.107 0.362 -0.177 15.919 -0.031 0.697 0.222
FI 0.847 0.854 0.048 0.116 0.459 0.073 16.742 0.031 0.827 0.153
FR 0.806 0.544 0.053 0.193 0.333 0.143 15.178 0.02 0.826 0.135
HR 0.622 0.739 0.029 0.084 0.359 -0.08 12.963 -0.012 0.555 0.312
IT 0.731 0.733 0.008 0.066 0.276 -0.11 18.168 -0.001 0.558 0.303
PL 0.766 0.6 0.052 0.062 0.443 0.317 16.53 -0.01 0.046 0.344
PT 0.724 0.677 -0.004 0.118 0.288 -0.052 14.526 -0.002 0.906 0.079
SE 0.495 0.816 0.062 0.104 0.265 0.208 18.784 0.09 0.011 0.081
UK 0.944 0.714 0.047 0.112 0.31 -0.35 23.891 0.009 0.138 0.524
Total 0.721 0.661 0.022 0.122 0.323 -0.043 15.913 -0.003 0.685 0.217
Note: Averages provided refer only to observations with positive debt, except for the debt dummy.
Firm characteristics included in the regressions were carefully selected to avoid mul-
ticollinearity issues5. These variables are included in the regression either in logs or as
4Note that since some of these variables are time invariant they are automatically dropped
from the fixed effects (FE) regressions. In regressions with country-level variables, we remove
country*time fixed effects as otherwise these variables would not be identified. We do however
always include country and time fixed effects.
5The correlation coefficients for all variables are provided in Appendix C
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ratios to total assets (see Table 3 for details). By normalizing by total assets a greater
comparability of firms with different sizes is also achieved. Lagged values of the control
variables have been included in the regressions to avoid potential endogeneity issues. Fi-
nally, some data feasibility adjustments were made in an attempt to further homogenise
samples across countries. Growth opportunity was limited to 100%; the leverage, liq-
uidity and tangibility ratios were limited to include observations between 0 and 1; and
the profitability ratio was limited to values between -1 and 1. All monetary variables are
deflated using the appropriate country specific annual price indices taken from the Euro-
stat database. In addition, adjustments for the differences in currency in Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Croatia, Poland, Sweden and the UK were also made using Eurostat exchange
rates.
3.1.2 Country-specific variables
A number of previous studies have identified significant effects of country specific char-
acteristics on capital structure (Hall et al., 2004, De Jong et al., 2008, Fan et al., 2012).
In order to asses the health of the banking system in each country, we include a
variable capturing the effect of bank concentration (Jo˜eveer, 2013a). Bank concentration
captures the effects of market power in the banking sector (Berger & Udell, 1998). We
also include the share of total bank assets held by foreign banks (Jo˜eveer, 2013a), as an
additional indicator of how competitive the banking sector is in each country. This share
can also be interpreted as an indicator of the quality of the banking system (Jo˜eveer,
2013a). Our working hypothesis is that differences in bank competition can alter the
degree to which firms across their lifecycle can access bank debt.
We are also interested in considering the impact of the systemic availability of non-
bank debt financing and whether this will affect capital structures. To do this, the ratio
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of the stock market capitalisation to GDP is included in this analysis as a proxy mea-
sure of the development of the equity markets in each country (De Jong et al., 2008,
European Central Bank, 2013, Jo˜eveer, 2013b). This variable measures the capacity of
stock markets to provide risk diversification opportunities for firms’ looking to invest
and grow (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996). Finally we also control for overall
financing availability by including the value of all external funding sources to GDP in
the regression. This variable accounts for the financial resources provided to the private
sector.
The country level macroeconomic variables included in the analysis have been ob-
tained from the Global Financial Development Database by the World Bank (World
Bank, 2017), since this type of information is not included in the Amadeus dataset6.
Descriptive statistics for the macroeconomic indicators used are provided in Appendix
B. Again, heterogeneity among countries and also variation across time can be observed.
Table 3 provides the definition for all independent variables included in the regres-
sions.
Table 3: Variable definition
Name Definition
Amadeus
Debt ratio Share of total debt on shareholders funds (i.e. capital plus debt)
Debt dummy Equals 1 for observations where debt is present; and equals 0 otherwise
Age Natural log of firm age, calculated the difference between the year and
the date of incorporation
Micro categ. Size category dummy constructed based on the EC classification (i.e.
turnover/total assets of less or equal than e 2,000). Medium firms are
the reference category
6This list of macroeconomic indicators is not exhaustive, and the inclusion choice was made
based on statistical significance and economic relevance of said indicators.
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Small categ. Size category dummy constructed based on the EC classification (i.e.
turnover/total assets of less or equal than e 10,000). Medium firms are
the reference category
Profitability Total firm profits to total assets
Collateral Tangible assets to total assets
Liquidity Cash stock to total assets
Output diff. Yearly differential of the natural log of total firm output
Growth opp. Yearly differential of the natural log of total firm output to differential of
the natural log of average output in each sector
Sector dummies Dummies for sector categories defined according to the NACE Rev.2
classification by the EC. HTM is the reference sector
Year dummies 2006 is the reference period
Regional dummies NUTS 1, 2 or 3 statistical regions (depending on the country); for country
specific regressions only
World Bank
Bank concentration Share of assets of three largest commercial banks on total commercial
banking assets (World Bank, 2017)
Stock capitalisa-
tion/GDP
Total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP
(World Bank, 2017)
Foreign bank assets
share
Percentage of the total banking assets that are held by foreign banks. A
foreign bank is a bank where 50 percent or more of its shares are owned
by foreigners (World Bank, 2017)
Financing availabil-
ity/GDP
Sum of private credit by deposit money banks and the total value of all
listed shares to GDP (World Bank, 2017)
3.2 Estimation strategy
In order to test the relations described in H1 to H4 in Table 1, a series of panel data
regressions are estimated. A notable contribution from our research is the treatment of
sample selection bias that may be present in estimates in previous studies that model the
debt-to-total funds relationship. As many firms do not have any debt (28% of the total
observations approximately), this suggests a selection into having debt as an important
determinant of the capital structure.
A traditional approach to the zero debt firms issue has been to estimate a censored
regression such as the Tobit model (Rajan & Zingales, 1995, Bharath et al., 2008, Euro-
pean Central Bank, 2013), or ignore this issue altogether. By following this approach,
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prior research has assumed that a firm’s decision to use some type of financing is influ-
enced by the same factors as those that influence its decision on how much of this type
of financing to use (Cook et al., 2008). However, when the decision to use debt is influ-
enced by different factors than the decision of how much debt to use, selection bias may
arise (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013, Kieschnick & Moussawi, 2018). Selection issues can
often occur in the area of corporate finance, and arises when the model to be estimated
refers only to a sub-section of firms of the whole population, who select themselves into
a certain category (Li & Prabhala, 2008). If self-selecting firms are not random subsets
of the population the usual linear estimators applied only to the subsets of firms are not
consistent. Credit constraints due to financial market frictions may prevent some firms
from accessing any debt and these factors may be correlated with many of the firm con-
trols used in the debt-to-total funds relationship. This suggests a two-stage relationship
needs to be modelled to determine the hurdle by which firms have to jump to access any
debt.
The econometric treatment of selection bias was offered in the seminal work by
Heckman (1979). He proposed a two-step approach, where the first step consists of
the estimation of a probit for the participation decision using all observations in the sam-
ple, after which the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is computed based on the the fitted probit
results7. On a second step, an OLS regression is estimated using only observations with
observed positive outcome, including the IMR as an explanatory variable. However the
estimation of this model in a panel data framework (such as ours) presents some chal-
lenges. Wooldridge (1995) suggests estimating a probit using cross-sections of data for
each of the T years included in the sample, and obtain T specific IMR. These then would
be included in a second step OLS regression pooling all data. This approach is unap-
7The IMR is defined as the cumulative density function divided by the density function (Ver-
beek, 2008).
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pealing for our research for two reasons. First, it relies on the assumption that the period
specific disturbances are uncorrelated with the next period disturbances (Li & Prabhala,
2008). Second, pooling data in the second step makes the identification of the effect of
age problematic, as no time variation is exploited in the estimation. Therefore, our pro-
posed methodological approach is as follows.
Step 1 - Dynamic probit
As the first-step we estimate a dynamic random effects probit using all observations.
The lagged dependent variable works as the exclusion restriction, necessary in selection
models, since it contains a large amount of information on whether or not the firm is
indebted and the structural reasons why it does without having to parameterise it. Ex-
cluding this variable from the second stage is also reasonable given the IMR will capture
the selection factors. The dynamic probit is defined as:
y∗it = βXit−1 +β Iit−1 +ρyit−1 +δtDt +δcDc + ci +uit (1)
Where yit = 1(y∗it > 0), Xit is a vector of time varying explanatory variables, Iit is a
vector of industry specific variables, yit−1 is the lagged dependent variable, and Dt and
Dc are sets of time and country dummies. Note that in what follows the initial period
is referred to as t=1. In order to estimate equation (1) the initial conditions problem,
defined as the correlation between the unobserved individual heterogeneity term ci and
the lagged dependent variable yit−1, needs to be taken into account because these models
assume that all independent variables are exogenous (Wooldridge, 2005).
A popular approach to deal with this issue was suggested by Wooldridge (2005). He
proposes to model the individual unobserved heterogeneity conditional on the initial pe-
riod yi1 and the values of the time varying Xit variables excluding the initial period. How-
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ever, this approach does not work well for unbalanced panel data (Wooldridge, 2005).
Alternative specifications have been more recently proposed (Rabe-Hesketh & Skron-
dal, 2013). A simplification of this approach, consisting on including individual specific
means of the time varying variables in Xit has been applied in previous analysis, however
Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal (2013) demonstrated that this solution faces some difficulties
when the panel is not very long. Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal (2013) found evidence that
excluding the initial time period from the within means reduces potential bias therefore,
this is the approach followed here 8:
ci = α0 +α1yi1 +αz+
′
i +ai (2)
where z+
′
i =
1
T−1 ∑
T
t=2 zit . The IMR is computed after equation (1) is estimated.
Step 2 - Fixed effects regression
The second step regression uses only observations with positive debt ratios, and in-
cludes the IMR computed in the previous step. We use bootstrapped standard errors to
account for the fact the IMR is estimated in a previous regression. The FE estimator is
considered more appropriate than a random effects (RE) approach if unobserved individ-
ual time invariant factors that are correlated with the independent variables of interest are
present (Verbeek, 2008). In this empirical analysis, FE is considered a more suitable es-
timator because some unobservable firm specific factors (such as improved performance
through increased experience) are likely to be correlated with age. Therefore, the second
step regression is defined as:
8Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal (2013) proposed yet another specification that includes the within
means (except the first time period) plus the values of the initial periods of all time varying
variables. This approach as well as the one proposed by Wooldridge (2005) were both attempted,
however convergence issues (likely due to the number of parameters) where present.
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yit = αi +βXi,t−1 +β Ii,t−1 +βDt +βDc + εit (3)
In equation (3) the Xit vector includes firm specific regressors, Iit includes industry
specific variables. Dt, and Dc represent year and country dummies.
The estimation strategy is as follows. The specification in equation (3) corresponds
to the baseline model. H1a,b described in Table 1 are tested by estimating equation (3)
using the pooled sample, and looking at the estimates for the age variables included in
vector Xit. In order to test H2, the model in equation (3) is estimated using the sub-
samples corresponding to each of the countries included in the analysis instead of the
pooled sample. H3 is tested by re-estimating equation (3) including interactions of the
age variables with collateral and liquidity. Finally, to test H4 we include the country level
variables in equation (3), together with interactions between each of the macroeconomic
indicators and firm age.
4 Results
4.1 Overall findings
The first column in Table 4 displays the estimates obtained using a RE probit model (step
1 of the estimation approach described), while the second column displays the estimates
of the FE regression (step 2 of the estimation approach).
Table 4: Regression estimates - Pooled sample
Probit (RE)9 FE reg.
9As described in Section 3.2 means of the time varying independent variables, and the lagged
and initial values of the dependent variable were included in the RE probit, but are not reported.
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Age -0.295∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.007)
Age2 -0.002 0.007∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Profitability 0.085∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.003)
Liquidity 0.090∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.002)
Collateral -0.089∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.003)
Output diff. 0.038∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.001)
Growth opp. -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Small (D) -0.079∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.001)
Micro (D) -0.279∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002)
IMR -0.013∗∗∗
(0.001)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Dropped
Sector dummies Yes Dropped
Year*Country dummies No Yes
Observations 2,288,806 1,654,709
Standard errors in parentheses (bootstrapped for FE reg.).
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
The effect of age on firms’ decision to acquire debt (column 1 in Table 4) and on the
decision of how much debt to have (column 2) is similar, with the exception of the age
squared term. The effect of age on debt ratios is negative, although the positive squared
term indicates that the relationship becomes less negative as firms get older. In relation to
the hypotheses set in Table 1, the estimates point to the rejection of H1a in favour of H1b.
Figure 1 displays the marginal effects of age (at the means). It shows how the negative
effect of age becomes less pronounced as firms become older. This result suggests that
mature firms have lower reliance on debt, as they are likely to be able to retain and use
more internal resources (Chittenden et al., 1996, Michaelas et al., 1999). Conversely,
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younger firms make more extensive use of debt. This finding has been reoccuring in the
literature. For example, using a similar dataset to ours, European Central Bank (2013)
also found that younger firms were more reliant on external financing than older firms.
A negative effect of age was also identified in Chittenden et al. (1996), Michaelas et al.
(1999) or Lo´pez-Gracia & Sogorb-Mira (2008).
Figure 1: Marginal effects of age - FE regression
These findings are in line with the pecking order theory (Lo´pez-Gracia & Sogorb-
Mira, 2008), implying that firms’ capital structure decisions are determined by the level
of firms’ internal resources and cash stocks rather than the agency costs or the relative
benefits of acquiring debt (Gonza´lez & Gonza´lez, 2008). The estimates also provide in-
direct indication of the importance of information asymmetry affecting SMEs debt use
(Berger & Udell, 1998). The estimates suggest that although age could be a proxy mea-
sure of reduced information asymmetry problems, this does not seem to be the case for
the SMEs analysed, as mature firms resort to debt to a lesser extent than younger firms.
The estimates obtained for the rest of regressors are broadly in line with previous
empirical research. The size dummies have negative coefficients, indicating that smaller
firms have lower debt ratios than the reference category which is medium firms, resulting
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in a positive effect of size (Rajan & Zingales, 1995, Lo´pez-Gracia & Sogorb-Mira, 2008,
La Rocca et al., 2011). Liquidity has a negative effect on debt, suggesting that higher
cash stocks make acquiring debt unnecessary for firms (Hall et al., 2004, Chittenden
et al., 1996, Michaelas et al., 1999, European Central Bank, 2013), suggesting that SMEs
are more likely to use internal resources when available. Growth opportunities have a
negative effect on debt, indicating that firms with higher growth prospects are likely to
take more risks. This negative effect may arise from difficulties in acquiring debt on
favourable conditions due to perceivced risk attitudes (Psillaki & Daskalakis, 2009), or
from reduced need for debt due to better growth prospects (Lo´pez-Gracia & Sogorb-
Mira, 2008). Collateral has a positive effect on debt, indicating that when firms have
higher fixed assets the cost of acquiring debt is reduced (Chittenden et al., 1996).
A regression including size weights was also estimated as a robustness check. Due to
the inclusion criteria used in Amadeus, it is likely that micro firms are under represented
in the sample (Jo˜eveer, 2013b), therefore a series of weights are built using Eurostat firm
size data. The effect of age maintains its significance and direction10.
4.2 Country-specific regressions
Cross-country differences in the effect of age on debt use were identified through the
estimation of country specific regressions. The effect of age was statistically significant
in nine out of the fifteen countries included in the analysis. The heterogeneous estimates
therefore confirm Hypothesis 2 in Table 1. Figure 2 displays the marginal effects (at the
means) of age for selected countries. The coefficients of the FE regressions are provided
in Appendix D11.
10Estimates are not reported here to save space but are available upon request.
11The estimates for the rest of countries are available upon request.
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Figure 2: Marginal effects of age - By country
Age has a positive relationship on leverage for Finnish SMEs, indicating that firms at
an earlier stage of their lifecycle appear to be less reliant on external funding as opposed
to later stages. The opposite effect is found for firms in Germany, Italy, France and
Portugal. In these countries, firms are more reliant on debt at earlier stages of their
lifecylce. Despite the important methodological and data differences, the results obtained
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for France and Portugal are in line with those obtained by Giannetti (2003). The results
obtained for the relationship between age and leverage for Italy also compare to recent
estimates in La Rocca et al. (2011). Overall the estimates presented in this analysis
indicate very heterogeneous effects of age on debt ratios of SMEs in different countries
in Europe. Such variation in effects is likely to be linked to differences across countries
in both firm level characteristics and country specific macroeconomic conditions, both of
which are explored next.
4.3 Lifecycle and firm characteristics
Table 5 provides the estimates obtained for the interactions between age and collateral
and liquidity, in columns 1 and 2 respectively. Note that in both regressions the IMR
obtained from the first stage is also included, and is statistically significant.
Table 5: FE reg. estimates - Age and firm characteristics
Age*Collateral Age*Liquidity
Age 0.017∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
Age2 -0.006∗ -0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
Liquidity 0.062***
(0.024)
Age*Liquidity -0.048∗∗
(0.024)
Age2*Liquidity 0.002
(0.004)
Collateral 0.295∗∗∗
(0.015)
Age*Collateral -0.139∗∗∗
(0.013)
Age2*Collateral 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003)
Control variables Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
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Sector dummies Dropped Dropped
Country dummies Dropped Dropped
Country*Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 1,654,709 1,654,709
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
By including the interacted terms, we aim to test whether the relationship between
age and debt is dependent on these firm characteristics. The estimates overall confirm the
expectations set out in Table 1. For the case of collateral, the coefficients in Table 5 show
that the effect of collateral on debt levels is reduced as firms become older, confirming
H3a in Table 1. Moreover, the effect is non-linear, implying that this reduction becomes
less pronounced at later stages of the firm’s lifecycle. The effect is also highly statistically
significant. Figure 3a plots the marginal effects of collateral at different values of firm
age. These findings support the hypothesis that mature firms have lower reliance on
collateral to obtain debt. Overall, this result suggests that although SMEs are generally
thought to be reliant on collateral to access bank credit, the extent of this requirement
varies depending on firm age, with younger firms facing higher constraints.
Figure 3: Age and firm characteristics
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The interaction between liquidity and age is also statistically significant and negative.
Figure 3b displays the marginal effects of liquidity at different ages, indicating that the
relative influence of liquidity on debt is reduced as firms mature, as hypothesised in H3b
in Table 1. Overall, the findings suggest the use of debt decreases when firms have
the capacity to retain higher internal resources, and that older firms are generally more
capable of doing so, as suggested by the baseline model.
4.4 Cross-country explanatory factors
In this section we explore the interaction between structural characteristics of the finan-
cial sector and the age-capital structure relationship. The estimates obtained in the FE
regressions including country-level indicators are displayed in Table 6. The first column
displays the results of the baseline model including the country-specific indicators, and
the next three columns show the results obtained for the interactions of age and the struc-
tural financial factors. The IMR obtained from the first stage is included in all regressions,
and is statistically significant.
Table 6: FE reg. estimates - Age and country-varying indicators
No int. Bank conc. Stock cap./GDP Frgn. bank assets
Age -0.035∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.018) (0.011) (0.008)
Age2 0.004 0.013∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Bank conc. 0.084∗∗∗ 0.006 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.032) (0.005) (0.005)
Stock cap./GDP -0.063∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.006)
Frgn. bank assets 0.094∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018)
Age*Bank conc. 0.078∗∗
(0.026)
Age2*Bank conc. -0.017∗∗∗
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(0.005)
Age*Stock cap./GDP -0.123∗∗∗
(0.012)
Age2*Stock cap./GDP 0.024∗∗∗
(0.002)
Age*Frgn. bank assets 0.072∗∗∗
(0.015)
Age2*Frgn. bank assets -0.021∗∗∗
(0.004)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Sector dummies Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Observations 1,654,709 1,654,709 1,654,709 1,654,709
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
The effect of all macroeconomic indicators is statistically significant. The estimates
confirm the importance of the effects banking sector characteristics on SMEs capital
structure. Bank concentration has a positive relationship with debt, as identified in Pe-
tersen & Rajan (1995), Gonza´lez & Gonza´lez (2008) or Jo˜eveer (2013a). This finding is
in line with the information-based theory, which suggests that higher bank concentration
helps reduce information asymmetry problems by improving the flow of information on
borrowers between banks, resulting in higher lending (Petersen & Rajan, 1995, Carbo-
Valverde et al., 2009). A higher presence of foreign banks in a country’s economy also
has a positive effect on debt. This finding is at odds with the general idea that foreign
banks tend to focus on financing large firms, due to their focus on transaction lending
rather than relationship lending (Berger & Udell, 2006) and their preference for hard in-
formation (Beck et al., 2011). Some analyses have challenged this idea recently however,
and noted that the presence of foreign banks could also benefit SMEs through diversified
financing products or loans based on guarantees (de la Torre et al., 2010) or through in-
creased competition in the sector (Beck et al., 2009). The effect of the stock capitalisation
to GDP ratio on leverage is negative. This result is in line with estimates in European
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Central Bank (2013) and Jo˜eveer (2013b), and it indicates that, in countries where stock
markets are better developed, the reliance of firms on bank finance might be reduced.
Figure 4, which displays the marginal effects (at the means) of the structural financial
indicators at specified ages, and the estimates in columns (2) to (4) in Table 6 are broadly
in line with the hypothesis set out in Table 1 regarding the interconnected effects of age
and macroeconomic indicators.
Figure 4: Age and banking structure indicators
The interaction between age and stock market capitalisation is negative, while the
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interaction with the age squared term is positive, and statistically significant in both cases.
This suggests that, as hypothesised in H4a in Table 1, firms might face less difficulties
obtaining alternative external finance through stock markets as they mature, resulting
in lower debt. The marginal effects of stock capitalisation on debt ratios at different
levels of age displayed in Figure 4a show an interesting pattern. During the initial stages
of the lifecycle, the marginal effects of the stock market capitalisation on debt ratios are
positive, and they only turn negative as firms get older. Indeed, older firms actually reduce
debt ratios in countries with high stock market capitalisation which suggests debt-equity
substitution for this subset of firms. These effects decline sharply with age but taper
off as firms mature. One potential explanation is that younger firms find it difficult to
benefit from stock market financing and still require debt financing, but as firms become
older and information asymmetries decline they are better able to take advantage of non-
bank financing. Moreover, the fact that younger firms have a higher use of debt in high
stock market capitalisation countries might be due to greater competition for older firms,
which makes debt providers target funds to younger firms. This would be consistent with
lower credit constraints and better credit access for younger firms in countries with higher
shares of non-bank financing.
The interaction between age and bank concentration is positive and statistically sig-
nificant, indicating that in countries with more bank concentration indebtedness increases
as firms age, which is in line with Petersen & Rajan (1995). Therefore, the estimates
support hypothesis H4b in Table 1, suggesting that higher bank concentration and the re-
sulting close relationships between lenders and debt holders proposed by the information
theory would mitigate problems of information asymmetry, benefiting loan application
of older firms. These estimates suggest that more concentrated banking systems do not
provide enough financing for young firms. This would be in line with findings in Ryan
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et al. (2014) which suggest that more concentrated systems limit credit access for younger
SMEs. According to Figure 4b, middle aged firms appear to benefit the most.
In terms of the findings for foreign bank assets, the estimates suggest that indebted-
ness increases across the age distribution as the share of foreign banks increase. This is
likely a loosening of domestic financing constraints as foreign banks bring new capital
into the economy and build new relationships. The marginal effects displayed in Figure
4c suggest that middle aged firms also benefit the most.
5 Conclusions
In this analysis we provide a comprehensive assessment of the effects of firm age on
the capital structure of European SMEs in selected countries using and updated panel
dataset covering the period 2005-2012. We focus on firm age as there is a clear gap in the
literature, since cross-firm and cross-country heterogeneity has not been explored before,
therefore contributing to the age-capital structure debate. Age is also closely related to
the relative use of internal resources versus external finance for SMEs, which is likely to
have been affected by the recent financial difficulties arising from the 2009 crisis.
Using the pooled sample, we uncover a negative non-linear effect of age on debt,
suggesting that younger firms are more leveraged. This is likely to be linked to the higher
capacity of mature firms to retain a higher level of internal resources. However, one of
the main contributions of our paper relates to the comparative framework used in the
analysis, which includes 15 different European countries. Since we use a homogeneous
methodology and data across countries, we are able to get comparable results of the effect
of age on firm level debt ratios. We find that the result obtained using the pooled dataset
did not hold when performing country specific regressions. For example, younger SMEs
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in Finland were found to have higher debt.
Another important contribution are the heterogeneous results uncovered in the coun-
try specific regressions, by accounting for the combined effects of age and several firm
level and country specific characteristics. For both the firm specific and country specific
heterogeneity, the estimates showed the great significance of the non-linear effects of firm
age when interacted with selected firm characteristics and macroeconomic indicators. We
provide further insights into the relationships of firm age and collateral and liquidity lev-
els. The effect of these firm level characteristics on capital structure presented differences
depending on the stage of the firm’s lifecycle. The estimates suggest that the negative re-
lation between age and debt relates to the lack of internal resources of younger firms.
Younger firms are also relatively more reliant on collateral to access bank debt than ma-
ture firms. We also identified a disparity of effects of country specific financial indicators
at different stages of the firm’s lifecycle. The estimates suggest that firms might face less
difficulties obtaining financing though stock markets as they mature in countries where
these markets are more capitalised, indicating that the effect of financing diversification
opportunities on capital structure depends not only on the level of development of stock
markets, but also on firm’s age. The interaction of age and bank system characteristics
suggested that middle-age firms benefit more from increased credit access arising from
higher bank concentration and presence of foreign banks. This positive effect, however,
declines after firms reach later stages of their lifecycle.
The results outlined in this analysis have important policy implications. First, younger
firms were identified to have more difficulties accessing external funding due to higher
reliance on collateral and liquidity. Considering the importance of these firms for job
creation (Lawless, 2014) and the overall evolution of the economy (European Central
Bank, 2013), our estimates offer support for the idea of designing policies focused on
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younger firms. Second, given the reliance of SMEs on bank finance, particularly in the
early stages of their lifecycle, the development and promotion of alternative and less risky
sources of external funding would be highly desirable, since it would allow to diversify
capital structures.
Some of the limitations of this analysis relate to the need to focus on banking finance
due to data and space constraints. For this reason we have not considered alternative
sources of financing that are typically used by some SMEs (such as venture capital, fam-
ily loans, etc.). Moreover, we have not accounted for the effect of different taxation
regimes, which is other macroeconomic factor typically found to influence firm debt.
These constitute promising areas for further research. An interesting extension of this
analysis would be to apply a dynamic panel data estimator in order to account for the
dynamic nature of firms’ debt decisions (Gungoraydinoglu & O¨ztekin, 2011). Finally,
since we have only explored the effects on total firm debt, further research could also
distinguish between different effects of age and firm and macroeconomic characteristics
on long and short term debt.
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Lifecycle SMEs
Appendices
A Distribution of observations by year and country
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
BE 4869 5274 5775 5883 6126 6270 5771 4391 44359
BG 3416 4308 7223 9887 12594 14705 13549 11686 77368
CZ 7576 10533 14038 15281 17119 17981 14642 6632 103802
DE 9 193 1126 3372 5047 5513 4753 1936 21949
EE 2863 3397 3873 4076 3015 2364 37 27 19652
EL 7864 8548 9119 9495 9979 10374 9351 5412 70142
ES 44901 49878 55763 47643 112119 111285 104000 29544 555133
FI 3598 4299 5417 5892 6835 6830 5743 4300 42914
FR 65309 75853 91437 97272 110858 101936 78042 35771 656478
HR 14457 16285 18775 19425 21114 22103 19559 16907 148625
IT 34775 42575 74488 86891 110156 102397 97319 49443 598044
PL 1648 2189 2817 3119 3355 2683 1832 357 18000
PT 316 744 89468 98539 105717 90347 72346 54362 511839
SE 1032 1175 1271 1285 1184 1179 1045 907 9078
UK 2253 2743 3411 3744 4264 4833 4343 2738 28329
Total 194886 227994 384001 411804 529482 500800 432332 224413 2905712
Number of observations by year and country reported.
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B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - MACROEC. VARIABLES Lifecycle SMEs
B Descriptive statistics - Macroec. variables
Bank concentr. Stock cap./GDP Foreign bank assets Financing/GDP
BE 75.936 61.831 30.589 122.01
BG 45.62 19.196 77.218 80.62
CZ 65.143 24.277 83.25 67.77
DE 76.688 38.839 11.415 130.75
EE 95.725 22.519 99.139 100.24
EL 62.98 43.08 11.402 133.76
ES 64.879 84.697 2 246.35
FI 95.553 75.396 83.696 155.99
FR 62.633 75.528 5.785 164.67
HR 55.476 49.255 90.195 111.82
IT 53.272 32.066 5.62 117.3
PL 37.918 33.297 75.146 74.55
PT 84.625 37.613 23.954 188.8
SE 95.768 100.68 0 215.47
UK 57.398 113.764 14.879 290.99
2005 61.354 63.463 17.8 143.37
2006 59.77 72.884 19.265 159.47
2007 65.404 74.605 21.102 175.51
2008 66.269 56.055 21.555 163.48
2009 66.567 47.476 19.293 166.6
2010 66.651 53.474 19.623 171.32
2011 64.597 46.064 18.49 165.71
2012 66.532 39.378 24.041 154.8
Total 65.207 55.541 20.054 164.99
Country and year averages of macroeconomic indicators (all observations).
C Spearman correlation coefficients
Debt/funds Age Profitability Liquidity Collateral Output diff. Growth opp.
Debt/funds 1
Age -0.005* 1
Profitability -0.123* -0.077* 1
Liquidity -0.335* -0.078* 0.320* 1
Collateral 0.227* -0.008* -0.102* -0.198* 1
Output diff. 0.020* -0.101* 0.264* 0.059* -0.008* 1
Growth opp. 0.007* -0.014* -0.010* -0.009* 0.009* 0.043* 1
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D. COUNTRY SPECIFIC FE REGRESSION ESTIMATES Lifecycle SMEs
Debt/funds Bank concentr. Stock cap./GDP Foreign bank assets Financing/GDP
Debt/funds 1
Bank concentr. -0.037* 1
Stock cap./GDP -0.046* 0.085* 1
Foreign bank assets 0.017* 0.150* -0.552* 1
Financing/GDP -0.015* 0.483* 0.667* -0.466* 1
D Country specific FE regression estimates
Germany Finland France Italy Portugal
Age 0.100∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.040∗∗
(0.057) (0.023) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016)
Age2 -0.048∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.013∗ -0.017∗∗
(0.024) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Profitability -0.049∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Liquidity 0.011 -0.053∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Collateral 0.109∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Output diff. 0.016∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Growth opp. -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Small (D) -0.023∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.015) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009)
Micro (D) -0.058∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009)
IMR 0.011∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Regional dummies Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Sector dummies Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,329 28,218 421,213 350,442 294,413
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (for regressions including the IMR). Robust
standard errors in regressions without IMR. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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